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Given the rise of revisionist states and recent challenges to existing alliance 
structures, small states now see a real possibility of having to deter their larger 
neighbors on their own. Some countries, specifically those in the Baltics, have 
established resistance groups as a cost-effective solution to deterrence; but do 
predatory states understand the pain that such efforts can inflict?
Research Question:
• How can small states maximize the deterrent value of resistance enterprise 
development during phase zero? 
• What significance does a potential invader hold for resistance capacity? 
• Which resistance capabilities are most coercive to an invader or potential 
invader?
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Findings:
Once combat overmatch was understood to exist, the relative strategic flexibility of 
an aggressor and sponsorship availability for the defender held the most identifiable 
significance to the potential invader. 
• Given at least some conventional combat power, small states can find deterrent 
value in overt resistance enterprise development during phase zero; the most 
identifiable components of which are a pervasive communication capability, 
apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation.
• Developing civil resistance potential is the most visible way to display those 
named capabilities - the potential invader may best perceive civil resistance, 
hundreds of thousands of people in the street, over a few young men training in 
the woods.
• The functions that provide resistance potential also counteract nonlinear or 
“hybrid threat” disruption and even if deterrence fails, like in 1940 Norway, those 
functions are the root of social resilience and resistance.
Future Research:
• What are the options and complications for employing cyber warriors as 
nonviolent and non-uniformed resistance members?
• Can the “Total Defense” Concepts employed in Norway and Sweden provide the 
necessary, visible, cognitive liberation required of existing efforts?
Research Design:
The field of consideration is narrow and relatively unexamined, as overt 
preparation for post-occupation conflict is rare, and cases in which it has been 
observed affecting deterrence outcomes are non-existent.  Qualitative analysis of 
historically oriented case studies,  the Prague Spring & Polish Solidarity, identifies 
what factors most contributed to the successes and failures of these movements. 
Given the lack of detailed cases where training resistance members affected a 
deterrence outcome, this study uses cases where the visible protest potential of 
a threatened population can stand in for observable preparation of a resistance 
force. As the study uses observed protest potential to stand for overt resistance 
capacity—since no one has attempted resistance development in an observed 
deterrence crisis—only an inductive, theoretical assertion is possible. Norway’s 
resistance to Nazi occupation is used as an exploratory case to corroborate 
theory building and illuminate risks in the endeavor of resistance organization.  
The majority of the information for this study comes from existing academic, 
historical, and governmental texts; some minor fieldwork, diffuse interaction 
with subject matter experts in European deterrence, is expected. 
